Al-Mawardi says, “If the territorial authority of this type of amir (Wali Khass) lies adjacent to a border he may not initiate a jihad except with the Caliph’s permission, although he must wage war on them and repulse them if they initiate the attack, without the Caliph’s permission, as this forms part of his duty to protect and defend what is inviolable.”[1]

In a unitary state, the armed forces are all unified under the caliph who is the Commander-in-Chief. He has the sole power to declare war and despatch the military. Philip Hitti (d.1978) says, “The army was the ummah, the whole nation, in action. Its amir or commander in chief was the caliph in al-Madinah, who delegated the authority to his lieutenants or generals.”[2]

Muhammad Haykal says, “For the management and disposal to belong to the Imam represents the ‘Asl (original position) in relation to the Qitaal (fighting) of the enemies, when he exists, and it is obligatory to obey him in accordance to the speech of Allah ta’ala:

يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓا۟ أَطِيعُوا۟ ٱللَّهَ وَأَطِيعُوا۟ ٱلرَّسُولَ وَأُو۟لِى ٱلْأَمْرِ مِنكُمْ

“O believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.”[3]

…Based upon this understanding, the one entitled to dispose of the affairs of Al-Qitaal is only the Imam and consequently obedience to the Imam is obligatory in respect to the matters related to managing the matter or affairs of Al-Qitaal.”[4]

Case Study: The First Crusade

At the time of the First Crusade (1096–1099 CE), the Caliphate was a confederation and the Abbasid Caliph Al-Mustazhir (r.1094-1118 CE) had no army. It was the Seljuk Sultanate which had the military power. After the death of Sultan Malik-Shah I in 1092 CE, the Seljuk Sultanate fragmented, leading to internal conflicts and a breakdown of centralized authority, which created a power vacuum in Ash-Sham. This internal instability allowed local governors, known as Atabegs, to become independent rulers of their respective territories. The most prominent atabeg dynasty in Syria was the Zengid dynasty, founded by Imad ed-Din Zengi in 1127 CE, who consolidated power in northern Syria and Iraq and eventually captured the crusader County of Edessa in 1144 CE.

Imad ed-Din’s son Nur ad-Din Zengi, was atabeg of Aleppo and it was through him and one of his famous generals Salahudin Ayyubi which managed to turn the tide against the crusaders.

Clearly infighting among the Seljuks, especially on a district (atabeg) level allowed for the crusaders to make local alliances and occupy the holy lands for nearly a century. Eric Hanne mentions, “After the relatively “cohesive” reigns of Tughril Bek, Alp Arslan, and Malikshah, the central Islamic lands experienced almost a century of constant warfare among the rival claimants to the Saljuq sultanate.”[5]

Carole Hillenbrand says, “At the time of the First Crusade the first focus for any call to jihad was the Sunni caliph in Baghdad; it was certainly he who was expected to be involved in a jihad and it was he who had the legitimate right to promote jihad against the Franks. This is the clear implication of the various delegations that made their way to Baghdad in the wake of the First Crusade, as we have already noted in Chapter 1. Although the Seljuq sultans restricted the caliphs’ movements, preferring them to be mere figureheads and not to meddle in the politics of the time, the Syrian religious leaders who went to Baghdad to summon support against the Franks seem to have believed that the caliphs were their principal recourse. Despite these expectations, there were no independent military undertakings sponsored by the caliphs, although the sources make it clear that some of the caliphs, such as al-Mustarshid and al-Rashid, did take the field with their own armies.”[6]

Having said this, if a strong regional state emerges like the Ottomans and Seljuks then as we saw with the crusades, they should have the ability to mount a successful campaign to repel the aggressors even if this isn’t ordered by the central caliphal government.

The Islamic civilisation flourished and many of the greatest victories of Islam took place when the caliphate was fragmented politically, but where each of the states was ruled by Islam which is the key overriding objective that must be maintained at all costs.

Notes

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[1] Abu l-Hasan al-Mawardi, The Laws of Islamic Governance, translation of Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyah, Ta Ha Publishers,p.52

[2] Philip K. Hitti, ‘History of the Arabs,’ London, 10th edition, 1970, p.173

[3] Holy Qur’an, Surah Al-Nisaa’, ayah 59

[4] Muhammad Khayr Haykal, ‘Al-Jihad wa’l Qital fi as-Siyasa ash-Shar’iyya,’ vol.1, Chapter: The Tenth Study: Qitaal Al-Ghaarah (fighting by raids or attacks) for the purpose of seizing the property of the enemy

[5] Eric J. Hanne, ‘Putting the Caliph in His Place: Power, Authority, and the Late Abbasid Caliphate,’ 2007, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, p.205

[6] Carole Hillenbrand, ‘The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives,’ Chapter: The Evolution of the Phenomenon of Jihad in Crusader Times, Edinburgh University Press, 1999