Former French PM Georges Clemenceau said, “War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men.”[1] This is because military thinking focuses on achieving specific, measurable goals using force, while political thinking considers broader goals and uses a variety of tools, including military force, to achieve them. Military thinking emphasizes rationality, analytical skills, and feasibility, while political thinking involves critical examination, analysis of political concepts, and consideration of public interaction and the political dimension within a community.

Samuel Huntington (d.2008) says, “A minister of war need not have a detailed knowledge of military affairs, and soldiers often make poor ministers. The military viewpoint will inevitably, of course, interact with the political objective, and policy must take into account the means at its disposal. Clausewitz voices the military warning to the statesman to note carefully the limits of his military strength in formulating goals and commitments. But in the end, policy must predominate. Policy may indeed ‘take a wrong direction, and prefer to promote ambitious ends, private interests or the vanity of rulers,’ but that does not concern the military man. He must assume that policy is ‘the representative of all the interests of the whole community’ and obey it as such. In formulating the first theoretical rationale for the military profession, Clausewitz also contributed the first theoretical justification for civilian control.”[2]

The wider political goals that serve the long-term interests of Islam and the Muslims must always take precedent over short-term military objectives. This means that executive power and authority must always lie with the caliph who has effective leadership over the military. This cannot be a ceremonial position but must be a civilian-military role which is known in modern times as a Commander in-Chief. This position maps to the position held by the Prophet ﷺ and the Rightly Guided Caliphs.

Hitti says, “The army was the ummah, the whole nation, in action. Its amir or commander in chief was the caliph in al-Madinah, who delegated the authority to his lieutenants or generals. In the early stages the general who conquered a certain territory would also act as leader in prayer and as judge.”[3]

We can see this distinction between military and political thinking in the steps Abu Bakr took immediately after his election, where he defied the advice of the sahaba and sent out the army of Usama to Northern Arabia, at a time when Medina was being threatened by rebel tribes.

Abu Huraira described the events after the election of Abu Bakr as the first caliph in Islam. “The Messenger of Allah ﷺ directed Usamah ibn Zaid, along with seven hundred men, to Syria. When they arrived at Dhu Khushub the Prophet ﷺ died, the Arabs around Medina reneged on their Islam and the companions of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ gathered around him [Abu Bakr] and said, “Bring these back. Do you direct these against the Byzantines while the Arabs around Medina have reneged?” He [Abu Bakr] said, “By the One Whom there is no god but Him, even if dogs were dragging the wives of the Prophet ﷺ by their feet I would not return an army which the Messenger of Allah had sent out, nor undo a standard (لِواءliwaa’) which he had tied!”

He sent Usamah, and every tribe he would pass by which was wishing to renege would say (to themselves), “If these (the people of Madinah) did not have power, the like of these (the army) would not have come out from among them, so let us leave them alone until they meet the Byzantines.” They met them, defeated them, killed them and returned safely, so that they (the tribes) remained firm in Islam.”[4]

The policy of Abu Bakr here falls under the area of siyasa sharia (Islamic politics) which provides general principles and guidelines on how to execute Islamic rules. The fact that the majority of the sahaba disagreed with Abu Bakr shows it was not a definitive matter, as they would never collectively disobey the Prophet ﷺ in this way. They understood that the caliph has the authority to execute the rules of Islam, and now that the Prophet ﷺ had passed away it was Abu Bakr who now had this executive authority as the Commander-in-Chief. In fact, Abu Bakr and Umar were actually part of the Army of Usama, but Abu Bakr had to withdrew so he could run the state, and he needed Umar as his wazir in this great task. This shows that it was the prerogative power of the caliph to manage the army as he saw fit. There is no definitive correct answer when it comes to siyasa sharia and we see both sides of the sahaba were acting on an ijtihad and political opinion here. In hindsight one can say ‘I would have done it like this’ but in the heat of the moment you make the best decision you can. We should critically analyse some of the military and political decisions of the caliphs and generals throughout history, in order to learn from their successes and failures but keep in mind that in the heat of the moment they made the best decision they could. This is especially important when we discuss the rebellion against Uthman bin Affan and the civil war in the time of Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Lt. General Akram (d.1989) says, “The despatch of the Army of Usama was an act of faith displaying complete submission to the will of the departed Prophet, but as a manoeuvre of military and political strategy, it was anything but sound. This is also proven by the fact that all the Muslim leaders were opposed to the move-leaders who produced, in this and the following decades, some of the finest generals of history.”[5]

On his death bed Abu Bakr said, “Indeed, I do not grieve for anything from this world, except for three things which I did that I wish I had left aside, three that I left aside which I wish I had done, and three about which I wish I had asked Allah’s Messenger.”[6] He then describes some policies that he implemented that in hindsight he wished he had done differently. “I wish, on the day of Saqifat Bani Sa’idah, that I had thrown the matter upon the neck of one of the two men (meaning Umar and Abu Ubaydah) so that one of them would have become the Amir [of the Believers] and I would have been his wazir…

I also wish, when I sent Khalid b. al-Walid to fight the people of apostasy, that I had stayed at Dhu al- Qassah, so that if the Muslims had triumphed, they would have triumphed, but if they had been defeated, I would have been engaged or (provided) reinforcement.

Furthermore, I wish, when I sent Khalid b. al-Walid to Syria, that I had sent Umar b. al-Khattab to Iraq; thereby, I would have stretched forth both of my hands in Allah’s path. (He stretched forth both his hands.)”[7]

This level of scrutiny over one’s actions is the hallmark of a true sincere leader. Someone who is willing to admit their mistakes and rectify them if necessary. Umar ibn Al-Khattab famously said when he was caliph, “A woman is right and Umar is wrong.”[8] The level of accountability present in the Rightly Guided Caliphs is what sets them apart, and makes them an example to emulate for any leader today or in the future. The Prophet ﷺ said,

فَعَلَيْكُمْ بِسُنَّتِي وَسُنَّةِ الْخُلَفَاءِ الرَّاشِدِينَ الْمَهْدِيِّينَ عَضُّوا عَلَيْهَا بِالنَّوَاجِذِ

“I urge you to adhere to my sunnah and the sunnah of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and cling stubbornly to it.”[9]

Notes

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[1] Georges Clemenceau. Former Prime Minister of France, https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00003062

[2] Samuel Huntington, ‘The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations,’ p.58

[3] Philip K. Hitti, ‘History of the Arabs,’ London, 10th edition, 1970, p.173

[4] Jalal ad-Din as-Suyuti, ‘The history of the Khalifahs who took the right way’, translation of Tareekh ul-Khulufaa, Ta Ha Publishers, p.60; https://shamela.ws/book/11997/63

[5] Lt. General Akram, ‘Khalid ibn Al-Walid: The Sword of Allah’, Chapter 11: The Gathering Storm

[6] al-Tabari, ‘The History of Al-Tabari’, translation of Ta’rikh al-rusul wa’l-muluk, State University of New York Press, Volume XI, p.149

[7] Ibid

[8] Muhammad As-Sallaabi, ‘Umar ibn Al-Khattab, his life and times,’ vol.1, p.215

[9] Sunan Ibn Majah 42, https://sunnah.com/ibnmajah:42